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Abstract: To counter the trend toward mechanization of research and aridity of critical 
analysis, this article makes a case for an interdisciplinary quest. To borrow Felix Guattari 
and Gilles Deleuze’s phrase, we are convinced that ‘everything is political, but every politics 
is simultaneously a macropolitics and a micropolitics’. With an eye to open-ended research 
questions, the article attempts to build a body of theoretical, political and anthropological 
considerations, which, it is hoped, could function as a case of enquiry into the mechanics of 
power, revolt and revolution. The objective is to draw comparative and phenomenological 
lines between the events of the 2011 ‘Arab Spring’, in its local ecologies of protest, with its 
global reverberations as materialised in the slogans, acts and ideals of Greek and Spanish 
Indignados and the UK and US occupy movements. In order to do so, it proposes to clarify 
terminological ambiguities and to bring into the analytical scenario new subjects, new 
means and new connections. The article resolves to lay the ground for a scholarship of 
silence, by which the set of unheard voices, hidden actions and defiant tactics of the ordinary, 
through extraordinary people, find place in the interpretation of phenomena such as revolts 
and revolutions. 
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‘What matters most is that people, all men,  
loose their sheepish instincts and habits  
that the millennial slavery inspired them,  
and they learn to think and act freely.’1 
 
 
 
 
The spark for what initially was defined by many as the ‘Arab Spring’ had among its 
numerous effects that of changing people’s perception about the Arab world.2  
In the view of most observers, including a majority of people living there, the region was 
perceived as being in the grip of an authoritarian spell that had slowed down the flow of time 
and transformed people into docile citizens, unwilling and/or incapable of challenging the 
status quo and its rulers.3 The myth of authoritarian survival permeated even more the 
academic world and policymaking circles, which seemed to have eyes only for those 
elements that guaranteed stability and longevity to the ruling elite.4 The totem of this 
scholarship was a strong leadership above everything else.  
It was not long before the outset of the civil war that Syria was referred to as a 
‘successful’ story of authoritarianism, capable of instilling obedience and fear of the ruler 
into its citizenry, which enabled its metamorphosis into a ‘disciplined society’ of non-
thinking subjects.5 The idea of a docile citizenry, in political terms, often would concretise 
in the portrayal of Arab societies as inherently chaotic and unruly.6 The 2011 uprising, 
however, revealed a more complex and vivid reality. Peoples’ and scholars’ perception and 
understanding of their political lives changed profoundly, confuting the Western (and 
Westernised) portrayals of Arab states. 
Above all, the misconceptions in much of the pre-2011 scholarship expresses a state 
of unpreparedness among most of the academic community including ‘us,’ the authors, for 
assessing the present with critical skills, or in other words a state of detachedness. The roots 
of this cultural and political diagnosis are also likely to be the source of further 
misconception during this long and conflictual moment of struggle in the Arab world. It 
permeates, perhaps, in the way we apply the dissecting tools of analysis, our disciplines and 
our field of enquiry. Indeed, the detachedness of the scholarship from the actual field of 
inquiry is, inter alia, part and parcel of the dominance of today’s methodological approaches. 
With the shift in the social sciences toward quantitative and macro-data methodologies, in 
tandem with the quasi-monopoly of rational choice theory, one need not to be surprised that 
the inner-workings and ground-level changes that inevitably feature in a (pre)revolutionary 
moment, are lost in translations. From numbers to phenomena, if the latter endeavour 
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actually occurs, social science scholars have remained mostly unaware of radicalising 
dynamics.  
To counter this trend toward mechanisation of research and aridity of critical 
analysis, this article makes a case for (and actually attempts to perform) a interdisciplinary 
quest. To borrow Felix Guattari and Gilles Deleuze’s phrase, we are convinced that 
‘everything is political, but every politics is simultaneously a macropolitics and a 
micropolitics.’7 With an eye to open-ended research questions, this article attempts to build 
a body of theoretical, political and anthropological considerations, which, it is hoped, could 
function as a case of enquiry into the mechanics of power, revolt and revolution. In order to 
do so, it proposes to clarify terminological ambiguities and brings into the analytical scenario 
new subjects of enquiry. 
This article preconfigures three salient points in framing, dissecting and analysing 
the events that go under the label of ‘Arab Spring.’ Firstly, it brings into the discourse the 
terminology – and related historical contextualisation – in approaching the ‘Arab Spring.’ 
Strongly embedded in Orientalist discourse, terminological preferences are part of a process 
of defining political phenomena; they bear significance per se, apart from revealing aspects 
of the mindset of the interpreter. Then the article proceeds to contest the Eurocentric 
linguistic, thematic and methodological modus operandi. The objective is to draw 
comparative and phenomenological lines between the events of the ‘Arab Spring’ in their 
local ecologies of protest and contention, with the global reverberations as materialised in 
the slogans, acts and idea(l)s of Spanish Indignados, Greek protesters, UK and US occupy 
movements. Eventually, the aim is to lower the perspective and cast light on what lies 
‘below’ the surface of Western eyes, defying the taxonomic imperative of much of the 
Orientalising analysis.  
In doing so, the article resolves to lay the ground for a scholarship of silence,8 by 
which the set of unheard voices, hidden actions and defiant tactics of the ordinary, through 
extraordinary people, find place in the interpretation of phenomena such as revolts and 
revolutions. The sources and analysis are inspired by the combination of the authors’ distinct 
researches, which draw on substantial field observation, both on-line and on the ground and 
participation in events related to the broad political mobilisation in the last decade. These 
elements constitute the backbone of the hermeneutic reflections on which the article is based, 
but they do not fully materialise in the narrative of the text, which, for reasons of contingency 
and pertinence, privileges a theoretical grounding of them.  
 
Terminological Schizophrenia: A question of words and politics 
 
When dealing with political and social events outside the boundaries of Europe and North 
America, scholars have had the tendency at times to use exogenous categories, derived from 
the social sciences and contextualised in the development of Western history. The downside 
of this approach was in being out of touch both with the changing realties of globalised 
societies and with the local dimensions in Middle Eastern countries. As soon as the events 
unfolded in Tunis, Cairo and other Arab capitals, for the sake of immediacy, observers 
brought back from the cold the toolkit of analysis that had been applied to other regions of 
the world. If the democratic wave had swept from Latin America to Europe and East Asia in 
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the last few decades, skipping the Arab shores,9 time had come to reconsider clinically the 
pathology of authoritarianism in its last and, perhaps more entrenched, manifestation. 
However, the whole system of paradigms and theories, on which the West stood, 
crumbled when the popular uprising broke out in Tunisia and unexpectedly developed into 
a regional phenomenon. Political, academic, and media analysts felt deep incredulity: From 
where did the uprisings arise? How can one explain and interpret the events? And did this 
mean that Arab societies and states no longer were inherently authoritarian? The academic 
world recited a mea culpa for having missed the Arab revolts. Gregory Gause modestly 
admitted that political scientists had been inebriated by the myth of authoritarian stability, 
failing to capture the ‘forces for change that were bubbling from below, and at times above, 
the surface of Arab politics.’10 The myth of change of regimes often passed through change 
in regimes, a development that largely had been unnoticed.11 
Scholars of Arab affairs and media analysts competed in labelling the 2011 upheavals 
with a number of symbolic and trendy definitions as the ‘Arab revolutions,’ the ‘Arab 
Spring,’ the ‘Arab Awakening’ and rather colourfully, if not slightly politically incorrect 
toward the Japanese, the ‘Arab tsunami.’12 As terminology is a locus of lasting influence in 
the understanding and imagining of historical events, it is surprising how uncontested and 
undebated has been the adoption of the terminology for the events in the Arab world.13 The 
rush in naming the upheavals resulted in the coining of expressions that have proven 
piecemeal, incorrect and hasty. We hereby offer an initial dissection of this terminological 
schizophrenia.  
Trying to find definitions for events is like forcing someone to wear tight shoes: 
They never fit perfectly! In this regard, the late political theorist Fred Halliday suggested 
that,  
‘Definitions of revolution are, like all definitions in social sciences, 
conventional: revolutions are not – any more than are nations, classes, even 
events or date – objectively given “things” waiting to be unearthed or 
identified like objects of natural science. They are phenomena which human 
subjects choose to group, on the basis of criteria of significance and 
recurrence, into one category rather than another.’14  
Yet, the fundamental need to provide analytical categories, surely of the dynamic 
type, is crucial to the world of a social scientist and, for that matter, a scholar of politics. 
The use of social theory is as important as the need to contextualise the theory in the 
localities of the phenomena. Terminology is not chosen randomly or methodologically 
insignificant. Terminology, pari passu with theory, allows the expression of ideas and 
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13, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/14/world/middleeast/un-syria-death-toll.html?_r=0 
(accessed on March 3, 2016).  
13 Michael Hudson (2011) "Awakening, Cataclysm, or Just a Series of Events? Reflections on the Current 
Wave of Protest in the Arab World," Jadaliyya, May 16, available at 
http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/1601/awakening-cataclysm-or-just-a-series-of-events-ref (accessed on 
March 3, 2016). And Bassam Haddad, Rosie Bsheer, and Ziad Abu-Rish (eds.), The Dawn of the Arab 
Uprisings: End of an Old Order? (Pluto Press, 2012). Cfr. Alexander, A. (2012) ‘Digital Generation’ in 
Ziauddin Sardar and Robin Yassin-Kassab, Critical Muslim 1: The Arabs Are Alive (Oxford University Press). 
14 Fred Halliday (1999) Revolution and World Politics: The Rise and Fall of the Sixth Great Power (Duke 
University Press), p. 25. 
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phenomena beyond the limited field of study.15  It generates, hence, a scholarship, which 
without terminology, would be hard, if not impossible, to configure or even to use as a 
reference. Language, wrote Walter Benjamin, is not simply and only the communication of 
what can be communicated, but also it is the symbol of what cannot be communicated.16  
 
Arab Spring, Arab Revolution, Arab Awakening or Arab Uprising? 
 
The Arab uprisings have been defined as ‘spring’ or ‘revolutions’ from the very beginning. 
The term ‘spring’ is a metaphor, which recalls the brief Czechoslovakian Spring of 1968, 
quickly halted by the Red Army of the Soviet Union. The term tends to minimise the 
intensity and courage expressed by the participants and is intrinsically both teleological 
(the inevitable sequence of winter-spring-summer-autumn) and a form of passivity (spring 
will come even if you refuse to take any action). In this regard, the word ‘spring’ shares 
something with the term ‘revolution,’ which is used in astronomy to refer to the movement 
of a celestial body around an axis in line with its orbit. The sequence of the seasons, as 
inevitable as it is, is coterminous to the cycles of celestial revolution; both are beyond the 
control of human agency. The conception of a revolution in European thinking as a sudden, 
radical change in the status quo derives from the effect of achieving a world upside-down, 
a bouleversement in the French version, which nonetheless is specular to the status quo 
ante and, as such, it is predictable. The idea of revolution as a radical change in history is 
in fact a modern concept, which dates back to the French and American revolutions of the 
19th century. Before these events, revolutions did not indicate a radical transformation, but 
rather a rebellion or a coup d’état, which would not necessarily interrupt the course of 
history with a new beginning.17 Though it acquired a new dimension in modern times, the 
term ‘revolution’ referred to the idea of ‘restoration,’ to the reoccurrence of stages in life, 
forms of governments, good or bad fate. This means that originally the term referred to 
cycles of governments that periodically happen in human history whereas today it is used 
to refer to a structural change from the past. Along this trend, the term ‘revolution’ has 
been trivialised and made semantically void by its adoption, massively, in advertisement 
and media campaign as much as, horresco referens, by conservative politicians calling for 
change. A Google search for ‘revolution’ provides ample support for this claim;18 
similarly, the slogan ‘the revolution is possible,’ used by Corrado Passera, Italian politician 
and banker with a career in US consulting firm McKinsey & Company – an emblem of 
corporate neoliberalism – is another disconcerting, example.19 When bankers adopt the 
language of revolt and revolution, it means that this political lexicon has been emptied of 
its politics. 
The Middle East arguably has witnessed ‘uprisings,’ conceived as mobilisation and 
oppositional moments at a popular level. Yet can we define these events as ‘revolutions,’ 
even when the people succeed in toppling oppressive rulers?20 Hannah Arendt argued that 
all revolutions are essentially expressions of taking action and starting something new, 
representing ‘the determination to act, [the] joy in action, the assurance of being able to 
                                                          
15 William A Gamson and Gadi Wolfsfeld (1993) "Movements and Media as Interacting Systems," The Annals 
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16 Walter Benjamin (1996) "The Metaphysics of Youth," Walter Benjamin: Selected Writings 1 (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press Cambridge). 
17 Hannah Arendt (1972) Crises of the Republic: Lying in Politics; Civil Disobedience; on Violence; Thoughts 
on Politics and Revolution (Houghton Mifflin Harcourt), p. 15. 
18 First results are in fact: ‘Revolution Vodka Bar’, US TV series ‘Revolution’; and a list of other companies 
and articles which refer to ads and marketing,  
19 See http://www.italiaunica.it/ accessed on November 27, 2015. 
20 Gilbert Achcar (2013) People Want: A Radical Exploration of the Arab Uprising (Univ of California Press), 
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change things by one’s own efforts.’21 If we limit our analysis to Arendt’s definition, the 
paradigm of ‘revolution’ would depict the events fairly well, as determination, joy and effort 
were key elements of the events in the Arab streets. Nonetheless, it is necessary to identify 
other layers of this revolutionary moment, if only for the sake of our theoretical framework. 
The literature on revolutions preserves an overly historicised depiction of 
‘revolutions’ and makes use of the past as a yardstick for the present. This methodology 
compares events in the Arab world with the cases of the 1989 Velvet Revolutions, the 
Iranian revolution of 1979 and the wave of European uprisings in 1848.22 While these 
revolutions had two main elements, the radical change to pre-existing political systems and 
the rise of charismatic leading figures, the Arab uprisings have not brought radical 
transformations, with the partial exception of Tunisia, and revolutionary leaders have not 
emerged in any of the countries. If leadership and radical structural change are essential to 
revolutions, it is inexact to use this analytical category for the events in the Arab world. 
There is a romance about revolutions as much as, in Lila Abu Lughod’s words, there is 
romance of resistance. Both impede at times the dissection of events in their political 
contexts and could be interpreted as categorical imposition. Yet one could add that they 
‘can help detect historical shifts in configuration or methods of power.’23 Revolution, as 
much as resistance, remains a narrative frame, which is referenced by those whose lives 
occur in revolutionary times, both as participants, and as experiencing witnesses. The 
difference between these two remains in the fact that resistance is everywhere, perceived or 
unnoticed, but revolution remains epochal and defines a rupture – also in temporal terms. 
To paraphrase Rosa Luxemburg: resistance is the means, revolution is its goal.24 
Others have interpreted the events as a fourth wave of democratisation or a slowing 
down in the uptake of Samuel Huntington’s Third wave.25 The enthusiasm of 
democratisation enthusiasts in applying democratisation theories to every corner of the 
globe seems out of place and inadequate. In the case of the Arab revolts, a number of 
countries such as Egypt and Libya have toppled the ruler, but have re-produced 
respectively an enhanced military system and a militaristic chaos, the latter oxymoron we 
believe describes adequately post-Qadhdhaffi Libya. In both instances, popular 
participation and representation have been de facto denied, even in their most basic 
procedural forms, while Western forces have re-adopted the historical position that favours 
authoritarian stability over anything else.  
Another expression that gained resonance in the Western semantic taxonomy is 
‘Arab Awakening.’ The term first used by George Antonius in his famous book The Arab 
Awakening (1938). The reutilisation of this term carries two disputable assumptions: The 
first is that the events in the Arab world represented an unprecedented and non-predictable 
event, which occurred ex abrupto. The second is that they arose from a political, civic and 
emotional dimension that was not there previously, or that existed only latently. According 
to this reading, the revolts were the result of random occurrences that, by virtue of fortune, 
took root and spread like wildfire. Did Arabs awake from a long sleep and decide to pour 
into the streets in a moment of madness? Or, a contrario, did the West become suddenly 
aware of the transformations taking place in the MENA region when they erupted in 2011? 
Who actually was sleeping? 
 
                                                          
21 Arendt, Crises of the Republic, p. 206. 
22 Paul Mason (2013) Why It's Still Kicking Off Everywhere: The New Global Revolutions (Verso Books). 
23 Lila Abu‐Lughod (1990) "The Romance of Resistance: Tracing Transformations of Power through Bedouin 
Women," American ethnologist 17, (1), p. 48. 
24 Rosa Luxemburg (1966) Social Reform or Revolution (Merlin Press). 
25 Larry Diamond (2011) "A Fourth Wave or False Start," Foreign affairs 22. 
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Arabising the terminology of revolt 
‘Awakening’ traces its history back to the naḥda movement in the late-19th century Arab-
speaking world. It emerged soon after the Italian Risorgimento, with which it shares also the 
actual meaning of the word naḥda, and the proto-idea of a unitary nation. The term 
‘revolution,’ in contrast, carries a variegated and pluralistic set of meanings. It is itself a site 
of struggle between diverging ways to interpret and, echoing Marx’s eleventh thesis on 
Feuerbach, to change the world. In a modest bid at redrawing and re-assessing terminology, 
we shall pay heed to how revolution and its close associates (i.e., revolt, awakening and 
uprising) is translated in the Arabic language.26 For example, in modern standard Arabic the 
term thawra (which derives from the verb thāra: to revolt) is used to translate the term 
‘revolution.’27 With a broad range of meanings, including insurrection, it originally indicated 
the idea of revolt rather than that of revolution.28 Indeed, it is another Arabic term, inqilāb, 
which best interprets the English word ‘revolution,’ with the meaning of ‘overturning,’ or 
the French ‘bouleversement.’ Inqilāb currently is used in Persian to translate the Western 
concept of revolution, both with its political and astronomic significance, whereas in Arabic, 
it unambiguously refers to the paradigm of coup d’état. One could dare say that the Western 
concept of revolution – being historical revolutions invented in the West29 – does not 
effectively belong to the cultural milieu and political horizon of Arab societies, at least not 
in the way Western scholars have prefigured it.30 
In the parlance of politicians in the Arab world, there have been several revolutions 
since the outset of the post-colonial era. The uprising against British colonial power in the 
summer of 1920 is recalled in Iraqi history books and throughout the Arab world as the ‘Iraqi 
revolution of the 1920’ (thawrat al-‘ashrīn). By all definitions, this event unwrapped along 
the lines of traditional anti-colonial uprising, yet the use of the term revolution gives it further 
legitimacy. The 1958 coup d’état that ousted the Hashemite monarchy in Iraq also is named 
officially as ‘the 1958 Revolution’ or the ‘July 14 Revolution.’ Similar considerations can 
be made for Egypt’s 1952 and Syria’s 1963 free officers’ coups d’état, or paradoxically to 
the 1980 ‘corrective’ purges led by Hafiz al-Asad, which went by the name of al-thawrat al-
taḥsisiya, ‘the corrective revolution.’  
Moreover, there is a subjective side, which derives from the voice of people who take 
part in popular movements of a revolutionary kind. As Rajesh Tandom and L. David Brown 
point out, Egyptians who toppled Mubarak call themselves revolutionaries, as do those who 
elected Muhammed Mursi and, paradoxically, those who supported Abdel Fattah el-Sisi’s 
coup.31 Hence, who are the revolutionaries and to what revolution is the reference? Again, 
revolutions are also narrative devices, to which political agents allocate certain 
                                                          
26 Among the Arabic terms that gained resonance in the Western imaginary, intifada is probably unique. 
Translated with the English word ‘uprising’, it usually refers to the context of Palestinian mobilisation against 
the Israeli occupation, with the objective of ‘shaking off’ (intifadà) the occupation. Because of the historical 
use of the term, Arab observers have avoided using this term in the context of the ‘Arab Spring’. 
27 Emblematic of the orientalising school, in this case, is Bernard Lewis, who explained that the Arabic word for 
revolution (thawra) derived from the rising up (of a camel) and, therefore (sic!), ‘revolt’. See Joseph A Massad (2015) 
Islam in Liberalism (University of Chicago Press), p. 10. 
28 The term was fairly translated into English when referring to the Great Arab Revolt of 1916-18, the 1920 
Revolt in Iraq, the Great Syrian Revolt of 1925, and the Great Palestinian Revolt of 1936. See Achcar, People 
Want, pp. 14-15. 
29 Together with nations, societies and states. See respectively Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (2012) 
The Invention of Tradition (Cambridge University Press); Benedict Anderson (2006) Imagined Communities: 
Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (Verso Books). 
30 On the delusions of etymology see Fred Halliday (1993) “Orientalism’ and its critics,” British Journal of Middle 
Eastern Studies, 20 (2), pp. 145-163. 
31 Rajesh Tandon and L David Brown (2013) "Civil Societies at Crossroads: Lessons and Implications," 
Development in Practice 23 (5-6). 
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phenomenological meanings in light of historical unsettledness. Thus, the term thawra, 
which means ‘revolt’ but is translated as, and often used, by Arabic speakers to refer to 
‘revolution’ – is a much abused one in the Arab world; lest one does not distinguish revolts 
from revolutions, heed should be paid to the use of terminology both in the local ecology 
and in the global analysis. 
 
Revolt, revolution, Nonmovement and Movement 
We identify the characteristics of the events of post-2011 in the Arab world along several 
performance elements. Firstly, these events were popular manifestations of social and 
political disaffection, with no clear leadership, no structured political organisations 
(although political organisations took part in them), no unifying objective other than the 
immediate, ‘the people want the overthrow of the regime.’ One can define them as the 
combination of existing social movements, such as the array of civil and grassroots 
organisations (workers’ unions, women’s movements, students movements), and the 
nonmovement of ordinary people, otherwise disengaged from active politics. Asef Bayat 
defines the nonmovement as, 
‘the collective actions of noncollective actors [which] embody shared practices of 
large numbers of ordinary people whose fragmented but similar activities trigger 
much social change, even though these practices are rarely guided by an ideology or 
recognizable leaderships and organizations.’32  
Bayat’s definition, which despite the author’s explication, is still remindful of 
Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt’s prefiguration of the multitude as a multifarious, 
manifold, multi-faceted entity made of individual subjectivities which bear immanent 
revolutionary power. Yet, Bayat’s anthropological sensitivity allows his definition to capture 
more accurately the potential of everyday ordinary practice against, or despite, the state 
authority. While the multitude of Negri and Hardt transmutes into an almost eschatological 
representation of humanity as a whole, Bayat, who is a scrupulous field observer and has a 
matchless feel for street politics, grounds his definition of nonmovement in anthropology. 
More significantly for our analysis, though, the nonmovement fits into our interpretation of 
the Arab Spring as a revolt, because the collective actions of the people (or the multitude) 
was concerned with the immediacy of the political action, never with the status quo post. In 
fact, the revolutionary momentum in Egypt, Syria and even Tunisia was mostly negative in 
its demands. It voiced popular resentment against what was not acceptable, injustice and the 
establishment. It was also the materialisation of popular exasperation against the progressive 
worsening of socio-economic conditions and the widening gap between the elites (both 
political and economic) and the rest. It was, in the words of Walter Armbrust, ‘a revolution 
against neoliberalism’ in Egypt,33 but also in Tunisia (and other Mediterranean countries). It 
did not propose alterative models, but it aimed at destabilising and dethroning previously 
established authorities, in furtherance of achieving dignity and economic security.  
The Tunisian slogan al-tashghil istihqaq ya ‘asabat al-sirqa [Job is a right, you pack 
of thieves] accompanied with the universal prayer in Egypt al-‘aysh, wal-horriyah wa 
‘adalah ijtima’iyya [Bread, Freedom and Social Justice) resonated all too familiar – also 
                                                          
32 Asef Bayat (2013) Life as Politics: How Ordinary People Change the Middle East (Stanford University 
Press), p. 14. 
33 Walter Armbrust (2011) "The Revolution against Neoliberalism," Jadalliya,, February 23, available at 
http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/717/the-revolution-against-neoliberalism- (accessed on March 22, 
2016). 
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across time – to the Greek chant ‘Bread, education, liberty.’34 The climate of protest and 
contestation that characterised the 2000s, although often described by NGOs, international 
observers and liberal activists as non-political, were prelude to the spontaneous participation 
of the 2010s. Beinin captures this, ‘In both Egypt and Tunisia, most of the oppositional 
intelligentsia failed to appreciate that in an authoritarian regime, recurring mobilizations of 
large numbers of people seizing control of public space—workers, the unemployed, devotees 
of the “apolitical” preacher ‘Amr Khalid, or soccer fans—are inherently political.’35  In this 
instance lies also the common ground between the Arab revolts and the Western protest 
movement, as we will discuss later. . 
Let us dwell a little further on these points, by bringing what the scholarship of 
Middle Eastern Studies and, sadly, politics normatively have excluded. What can we identify 
as the horizon of political change among the multitude of people who took to the streets 
during the Arab uprisings? Political philosopher and anthropologist Furio Jesi has outlined 
the essential difference between revolution and revolt: 
We use the word revolt [rivolta] to designate an insurrectional movement 
different from the revolution. The difference between revolt and revolution 
does not exist in the goals of one or the other; both might have the same goals: 
the seizing of power. That which distinguishes revolt from revolution is instead 
a different experience of time. If, according to the meaning of the two words, 
revolt is a sudden insurrectional outburst, which can be inserted into a strategic 
design, but which does not imply a strategy in the long term [una strategia a 
lunga distanza], and revolution is instead a strategic complex [un complesso 
strategico] of insurrectional movements […], one can say that revolt suspends 
the historical time and establishes a time when everything which happens has 
a value per se…the revolution instead is entirely and deliberately entrenched 
in the historical time.36 
What does this distinction imply for our understanding of the transnational events 
collectively referred to as the ‘Arab Spring’? It shows that the two concepts of revolt and 
revolution, albeit different, exist in a symbiotic relationship: There can be no revolution 
without revolt, although the contrary is not generally true. Despite the several terms that we 
have scrutinised hitherto, it seems that, analytically, the ‘Arab Spring’ can be situated 
between two paradigms of political mobilisation and change, that of ‘revolution’ and 
‘revolt’. Their intrinsic difference lies in the conceptual timeframe of the movements that 
support them. Revolutions are struggles for the ‘after tomorrow’ and the ‘other yesterday,’ 
but revolts long for immediate results, for the ‘now’ and ‘tomorrow.’ They are the 
materialisation of an overwhelming sentiment of impatience, which unfolds in the collective 
action of otherwise perceived passive communities and individuals. In this case, the revolts 
were against the marketization and profit-seeking authoritarian state (as embodied by the 
ruling elites, Gramsci’s classe dirigente).37 This struggle had been largely unnoticed for more 
than a decade, even though Egyptian, Greek and Tunisian workers, the unemployed and 
students had called for mass strikes, occupied public places and complained against 
degenerating precariousness and worsening economic conditions.38 For instance, Greek 
workers had called for a mass strike against unprecedented austerity cuts in May 2010, and 
five people had lost their lives on that occasion. A year later, in 2011, the Indignant 
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movement in Greece occupied Synthagma square, connecting its struggle with those in 
Tahrir Square. 
Yet, if one considers the political developments in Egypt after the 2013 coup d’état 
by General Abdel-Fattah el-Sisi, it seems clear that the dynamics of the revolt have 
metamorphosed into a phenomenon, à la the theory of Antonio Gramsci, of passive 
revolution. This development conceals great analytical depth, as the events were marked by 
an active social upheaval, albeit of the disorganised type (the nonmovement), which brought 
immediate results in the power contest. Indeed, the fall of Hosni Mubarak exemplified the 
success of the popular revolt, as much as it did in Tunisia with the ouster of Ben Ali. Yet, 
the small ruling elite which emerged from the unrest of post-Mubarak Egypt led to the 
creation of power and a new institutional framework much in line, both in the means of 
coercion and the structure, with the previous regime. New groups of people are now in power 
across the region, but the fundamental structures of government have remained largely 
unchanged. It is what Gramsci defines as a revolution without a revolution.39  
Apart from buttressing our argument of the ‘Arab Spring’ as a moment of revolt, the 
concept of passive revolution also elucidates some of the trajectories of the current regime 
of power, for instance, in Egypt. Gramsci defines passive revolution as ‘a process whereby 
a social group comes to power without rupturing the social fabric (as in 1789 France) but 
rather by adapting to it and gradually modifying it.’40 The category of revolution holds 
ground inasmuch it is a narrative device among the people, yet it loses its momentum in face 
of counter-revolutionary dynamics. The revolution was aspired and narrated – and in that 
respect experienced as a manifested historical event, yet it did not materialise in substantial 
effects. Hierarchies were neither overturned nor abandoned. 
As argued earlier, the Arab streets were shaken by disorganised arrays of ordinary 
people who united with formal groups, such as workers and students, who had maintained 
antagonism to the state over the preceding decade and now found synergies with a new 
multitude. The events situated in a historical time that was impacted by the economic crisis 
in Europe, exacerbating the multiple social crises already existing in the MENA. In other 
words, one could add that ‘the global crisis did not cause the revolts, but it was an essential 
ingredient of it.41 Arguably, the people, conceived as the collective of informal groups not 
directly engaged in institutional politics, led the revolutionary moment but failed to seize the 
symbols of power, in other words, to make space for their entry into a historical time.  
The terminology provided by Jesi, whose analysis focused on the 1919 Spartakus 
revolt led by Rosa Luxemburg in Berlin, established a number of connections with our 
terminological analysis of the ‘Arab Spring.’ One confidently can state that what occurred 
in 2011 in several Arab countries has been a political revolt. This revolt, regardless of its 
outcome (which has been fragmentary and indiscernible), broke the historical time in which 
Arab countries had been imagined, both by local and global observers. If Arab societies were 
portrayed as passive – because inactive, and silent – because unheard, they could not be 
taken as the triggering model of revolt and opposition across the Global South and the West. 
Yet, in their demand for social justice, freedom and their opposition to the reduction of 
people to subjects of economic calculus, the identity of ‘Arab’ protesters resembled all too 
clearly that of protestors across the Mediterranean and the Atlantic.  
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‘Them’ and ‘us’: Local globalities or global localities? 
Although the long term outcome of the revolts in the Arab world is not clear, we can draw 
one conclusion: The results of the historical events defied all expectations and political-
logical models. No linear transition to democratic governance occurred, including in Tunisia, 
but neither have the revolts, once and where sedated, generated a status quo ante. The 
euphoria of the first months evaporated into disillusion, expressed through a new 
terminology and new definitions, containing the sense of scepticism and failure felt. 
Observers began referring to the revolts as the ‘Arab Winter,’ and/or the ‘Islamist Winter,’ 
and detailing them with connotations that were much the opposite of their initial claims. 
Again, the paradigm of the impossibility of change and exceptionality of the Arab world had 
a comeback. The failure in understanding the events on the ground and those that pre-dated 
them reverberates in the narrative adopted by most of the international and local media, 
politicians and often academics, who seem to keep readopting the idea of ‘Arab 
exceptionalism.’ Joseph Massad refers to how Muslim and Arab countries were seen as 
incapable of embracing democracy, in the way Japanese, Indian and Latin American people 
have done, because of a presumed ‘Islamic failure to democratize.’42 It is sufficient to note 
how the same idea of an ‘Arab Awakening’ is a linguistic device to reiterate that same 
message, i.e., Arabs’ inability to produce democratic change.43  
Western scholarship on the ‘Arab Spring’ has been largely deficient of an 
understanding of the phenomenon, not only because of a detachedness from the actual field 
of enquiry (the Arab streets and populace), but also because of its disconnectedness from 
political ferment in Europe and the United States.44 The latter conditions the interpretation 
of the Arab world and its politics greatly; it hampers the emergence of a coherent narrative 
of revolt between the events in the Arab world and the social protests in the capitals of the 
West. This is exemplified in the use of skilful linguistic and thematic choices. The most 
common and effective way has been that of emphasising the diversity between ‘they’ (Arabs 
and Muslims) and ‘us’ (Western); and the adoption of tones at times pathetic, more 
appropriate to the description of exotic topics than everyday civil resistance.45 Yet, what is 
most extraordinary is the adoption of such a narrative not just by the West but also by local 
news outposts and elites.46 De facto, the West cocooned Arabs into a crystal casing, which 
paradoxically has been internalised by the same subjects. Edward Said had argued that 
Orientalism is not just an attitude of the West toward the Middle East, but also an attitude 
that is appropriated and interpreted by local elites and experts.47 The late Fouad Ajami is 
case in point of this self-Orientalization. An Arab observer with Western scholarly 
credentials and academic career, he exhibited the effect of Orientalism, as he recognised 
Arab exceptionalism as an actual phenomenon and attributed to it the causes for the intrinsic, 
regressive culture of Arab societies.48 Islam becomes, after the Orient, antonym of the West, 
or for that matter, secularity, whatever its actual content is. Crucially, Islam – and the Middle 
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East consequently – operates as an internal category of Western politics, producing a 
perception of the West as liberal, tolerant and advanced.49 To put it more crudely, when 
Western protestors demonstrate, occupy squares, confront the police and challenge the 
political establishment as a whole (e.g., Indignados of Puerta del Sol or the Indignant 
Movement of Synthagma Square, etc.), they are framed as the discontent of the economic 
crisis and austerity, but when Arab protestors take to the streets they simply are mobilising 
against dictatorship, for democratic government or vice versa barbaric bloodthirsty Islamists. 
 However, there are similarities between the local (Arab) manifestation of dissent and 
the global (Western) movement against capitalism (and economic crisis-cum-austerity). 
They both appear as elements of one global localised community of protest, albeit differing 
in the immediate objectives for which they aspire. Both Arab and Western protestors share 
an underlying coherence of language of dissent, mobilization tactics, social ideals, and they 
also object to similar means of repression (with differing intensity). Understanding these 
shared elements has the benefit of framing the analysis of the ‘Arab Spring’ not as an 
exceptional and legendary event, but rather of shedding analytical insight on the events, the 
scope of Western political manifestations and, potentially, on their genealogy.  
The emphasis on the new generations and their use of new social media technology 
is one way the Arab revolts prefigured events in Western cities. The Arab revolts have passed 
into history as the ‘Facebook, Twitter or YouTube revolutions,’ given the prominent role 
that these tools had in ensuring the burst of the revolts, promoting dissent, breaking the 
barrier of fear and coordinating the logistics of the upheavals.50 The binomial digital media 
and new generations tend to convey the impression that the Arab uprising has been caused 
by Western technology rather than the people in the region. In this regard, Tarak Barkawi 
asserted:  
To listen to the hype about social networking websites and the Egyptian revolution, 
one would think it was Silicon Valley and not the Egyptian people who overthrew 
Mubarak.51  
Differently from the codes of actions and revolutionary practices exemplified by the popular 
mobilisation in the Global South (e.g., 1958 Cuba, 1979 Nicaragua, 1994 Chiapas), the tools 
of information technology and the internet transformed the fight into a peaceful one (read: 
non-violent, no bullets). Claims and demands turned around, in the West as in the Arab 
world, ‘real,’ ‘true,’ ‘radical’ or ‘participatory’ democracy; its fundamental, for how vague, 
objective remained political participation, representation and, as we discuss later, dignity 
among an ‘outraged’, ‘indignant’ population.52 In this, one also can identify the limits and, 
perhaps, weaknesses of both political events. In neither case, were the demands structured 
explicitly around a new model of power, of state, of political life. For however interesting 
and appealing ‘true democracy’ could be, it did not address through which means it would 
contain the intrusive, reactionary forces of capital, army and security. And as social media 
represented mostly demands of ‘freedom of expression,’ ‘free elections,’ and ‘democracy’ 
they also excluded the more contingent and, indeed, revolutionary program of working, 
popular classes, as emblematised by workers and the poor. For instance, groups of Egyptian 
workers after the fall of Mubarak, demanded, ‘If this revolution does not lead to the fair 
distribution of wealth it is not worth anything. Freedoms are not complete without social 
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freedoms. The right to vote is naturally dependent on the right to a loaf of bread.’53 Yet, 
claims as these, largely were disregarded in the online communities, or were present only in 
its marginalia, similarly to the way European protests were portrayed as against the crisis, 
and not against the economic regime. Joel Beinin, once again, provides insight on a case 
from Tunisia: 
Tunisian cyber-dissidence first emerged in 1998. But bloggers rarely discussed 
workers or protests in the interior regions. Many adopted an apolitical, “moderate” 
stance. Lina Ben Mhenni (“A Tunisian Girl”), one of Tunisia’s most acclaimed 
bloggers, was among the organizers of the May 22, 2010 protests in Tunis, Paris, 
Bonn, Montreal, and New York demanding an end to Internet censorship. They 
instructed participants not to bring “flags or music which could give a political or a 
religious meaning to the demonstration.” Many Internet activists lived abroad. 
The Debatunise blog noted, “Cyber-dissident speech remains confined to a limited 
Tunisian reality responding to frustration of a particular social group. . . . There is no 
doubt that the members of this ‘club’ are the local or immigrant bourgeoisie.”’54 
Yet, the insolubility of popular demands through the social media sphere should not 
overshadow other meaningful effects. The use of social media is also significant because it 
shows how the Arab protestors preceded and offered a model for European and Western 
social movements. Firstly, Arab protestors made use of digital media in order to bypass the 
limits of mainstream, national media’s coverage of the events. By sending images and videos 
online, they also provided material models of organisation to other protestors around the 
globe. One example above all is represented by the crucial spatial occupation of squares and 
parks, which first was performed in Tahrir Square and imitated, for example, in Madrid’s 
Puerta du Sol, Athens’s Synthagma, Barcelona’s Plaça Catalunya and Istanbul’s Gezi Park. 
This connected the visibility of the digital/virtual sphere of the new media with the material 
struggle for space in the squares. A leading Greek activist said, ‘in May 2011, the spirit of 
Egypt came via Spain to Greece.’55 He forgot to mention that more than Spain, it came from 
the digital connections that the activist community – as a communication avant-garde of the 
revolt – had with other movements across the Mediterranean. The Arabs not only 
reinterpreted and readopted the new media according to their needs, but also they struggled 
(by using them) to raise their voice above the Western tendency to adapt the news to their 
own views, so in a way the new media have become the means to bypass their national 
censorship and the one imposed by the West. 
Although the connection between the Tahrir Square model and the mobilisation in 
the European capitals is evident to the activist community, it has been misrepresented in the 
mainstream media. The new media tools, created mostly by Western companies and 
therefore an invention of the West, shorten distances and make the younger generations of 
the Arab revolt more similar to the European/American. They also enhance a class 
dimension, as poorer strata of the population have limited or no access to them and they are 
therefore less visible in the virtual space, as mentioned above in reference to Egyptian and 
Tunisian workers. Thus, the middle class of the Arab societies lie under the surface of the 
images, leaving the spotlight to young, often female, college and university students. As 
such, IT has had the potential to redeem the image of the Arab world as underdeveloped, 
dangerous, chaotic, violent, passive and in need of help (from the West). By doing so the 
new technologies also discharge the new generations of the Arab world of the epithet of 
‘terrorists.’ It gave credit to a reversed image of the Arabs, one that, ontologically, contrasted 
with the images and videos of al-Qaeda and ISIS-like groups. Hence, this type of reading 
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seemed to assert that the new Arab generations are ‘modern’ in that they are IT-savvy, 
‘peaceful’ in virtue of their civil disobedience and non-armed resistance; ultimately, they 
were at odds with Islamist fundamentalists. Some observers even interpreted the ideology of 
the Arab youth as inspired by the ideas of non-violence theorist Gene Sharp, of whom most 
Arabs probably had never heard.56 The paradox, after 2013, comes with the emergence of 
ISIS and their telegenic and cyber-savvy use of social media, which are deployed almost 
exclusively to foment sectarian hatred, celebration of violence and spread of terror. The 
young, defiant Arabs return to the background as the revolts acquiesce on the surface, 
nonetheless of digital screens. 
Furthermore, the perception of Arab and Islamic identity with terrorist organisations 
in European discourse is still not settled.57 A report by the EUROPOL about terrorism in 
Europe pointed out that in 2013 there were 152 ‘terrorist attacks’ in European states, of 
which only two were connected to religious (read Islamic) extremism. The remaining bulk 
of the attacks were connected to separatist and anti-systemic organisations, often belonging 
to far-right, xenophobic cells. Yet, national news outlets have been referring to the danger 
of Islamist groups operating on European soil, well ahead of the events in Paris during 2015; 
very little reference is made to right-wing groups, some of which also are represented in 
national parliaments. Indeed, the Europol report highlighted the need for increasing 
surveillance of individuals across the EU, implying stricter control on personal movement, 
political and religious activity, all of which have been materialising after the coordinated 
attacks by ISIS in Paris in November 2015. All of this occurs in the context of tighter 
measures on the phenomenon of refugees and the covering up of Saudi-Turkish relations 
with Islamic State fighters.58 Besides buttressing and consolidating the perception of an 
Islamic threat in Europe, it seems that the measures proposed by national governments have 
other, more political, objectives. To which extent, one could contend, the security measures 
applied by France, the UK and other European countries are aimed at curbing Islamic 
terrorism and not at increasing the state’s potential of preventing social mobilisation in times 
of economic crisis?  
In fact, there is resemblance between the post-revolutionary measures in Egypt, 
Libya and other Arab countries and the security measures taken by the Greek, Spanish and 
UK governments in the wake of popular protest. The emergency laws by Egypt’s 
government-cum-army, both nationwide and in the Sinai, embody this post-revolutionary 
governmentality. In November 2013, the Egyptian interim president imposed hefty fines on 
any public gathering of more than ten persons, without previous governmental approval.59 
Similarly, in the wake of the mass movement of the Indignados, the right-wing government 
in Spain pushed forward legislation, which would ‘elevate passive resistance to a criminal 
offense, including blocking the entrance to public buildings and sit-ins.’60  The law applies 
fines of up to $600,000 Euros for unauthorised demonstrations in front of the Parliament and 
up to $30,000 Euros for insulting the police.61 More recently, the UK parliament has passed 
a law undermining the capacity of civil society, and especially trade unions, to put pressure 
on the government. The UK government thus is able to impose fines on unions for not having 
a completely accurate membership list and impose restrictions to civil society campaigning 
ahead of elections, through a combination of bureaucratic maze and heavy fines.62 The list 
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of measures along the lines outlined above is long and we shall not dwell longer on it to 
demonstrate its relevance. 
There are other shared elements in the unwrapping of Arab and Western protest 
movements. The horizontalism of Arab protesters entered in a dialogic and mutual relation 
with the Western activist communities, despite the little recognition that it has had hitherto. 
As Paul Mason’s interviews with key participants confirm, horizontalism was the main 
feature of the Arab protestors’ modus operandi.63 Informal, participatory and direct 
democracy groups operated and communicated with each other across the Mediterranean 
and the Atlantic. Even in the case of Syria, since the beginning of the uprising, local 
committees and councils began to operate out of the blue, with a broad network of 
participants and with no aid or support from external entities. Conceptualised by the thought 
of the Syrian anarchist named Omar ‘Aziz, who had died before Western media could pay 
attention to him, the local councils were forms of autonomous, non-hierarchical, self-
governed organizations based on the principle of cooperation, mutual aid and psychological 
support.64 The local committees embrace all segments of the society; they are structured 
horizontally, deal with the provision of basic services, coordinate with the local councils and 
with armed resistance groups, and allow for local management of security concerns.65  
Indeed, the self-organisation of protestors and civic activists, whether in Tahrir Square, in 
Aleppo’s war-torn neighbourhood, or Zuccotti Park in New York, had similar opposition 
tactics. David Graeber, anthropologist and long-life activist, shows in his book, The 
Democracy Project, how protestors in Egypt, Barcelona, Athens and New York had channels 
of communication about everyday matters of struggle, such as how to defy police 
surveillance, and how to self-organise a horizontal and deliberative meeting among 
numerous protestors. They also shared their views about the strategy adopted by the police 
and the security apparatuses to deter them.66 To provide a rather facetious yet symbolic image 
of the inter-connectedness of local Arab protests and global anti-capitalist protest, Graeber 
brings in the role of pizza express. ‘Inspired by the example of the Egyptian labor unions 
that had sent pizzas to fellow union activists occupying Wisconsin’s statehouse some months 
before,’ Graeber writes, ‘hundreds of people across North America and beyond reached for 
their credit cards and began phoning in orders for pizzas.’67 The pizza connection is a more 
profound token of global solidarity among subaltern groups, of the variegated and 
unclassifiable type. It also unveils a common thread among the local protesters in the Arab 
streets, which, as we argued above, did not have politico-ideological schemata, but 
manifested their will to dignity [karamah] and justice [‘adalah], and the global protesters of 
the Occupy movements. After all, Indignado is the Spanish word for ‘outraged’, which, 
derives from the word ‘dignidad’, ‘dignity’, karamah. Dignity might turn out to be a catchall 
for the aspirations, demands and idea(l)s of protestors across the Mediterranean and the 
Atlantic and, as such, might ‘obscure its economic and social aspects and the aspirations of 
its initiators.’68 In this respect, ‘dignity’ is unifying, yet homogenising; it brings the poor and 
the workers on the side of students and intellectuals; it bridges the epistemic divide between 
the Arabs and the rest; it refers to a human gasp which is undeniable and yet it declines, at 
times, the imperative to materialise dignity, a step that necessarily prefigures contradictions. 
What does this ‘dignity’ ultimately signify? The concept seems to unfold common 
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contradictions, aspirations and struggles in the West as in the East. Hence, how to integrate 
these phenomena across social, cultural and economic localities, into a unique, yet dynamic, 
global scholarship? 
 
Conclusion: a scholarship of silence 
 
In the past two decades, the social sciences have been overwhelmingly occupied with 
evaluating to which extent theories of democratic rule have been adopted and respected 
across the globe, in particular the non-Western world. One implication of these, writes 
authoritatively the political scientist Paul Brass, ‘is that we have been unaware of the kind 
of society we live in, […], of the confined, restricted, and ultimately inconsequential 
character of our participation in political life as citizens’.69 One could add that we have been 
also unaware of our political life as academics, unaware of the ‘passive’ actions of political 
subjects across the Mediterranean region, as much as we have been deaf to the silent voices 
of all those who expressed in words, arts, acts and virtual signs a semantic of revolt against 
state power and the status quo. This changing consciousness, which preluded to the outburst 
of popular uprisings in the Middle East, did not go hand in hand with the transformed 
hermeneutics of the region, given the fact that the majority of the academic community of 
Middle Eastern studies operated in their everyday scholarly existence as consultants, experts 
of high politics and disengaged intellectuals. This epistemic community could not possibly 
capture the region’s new perceptions and practices while it was unearthing new models of 
grassroots politics. The objectives of the epistemic community were narrowly focused on 
evaluating, ‘calculating’ and schematising old/new political alliances, electoral procedures, 
transparent administrative mechanisms to coherent and compatible (to the West’s capitalist 
regime) laws and legislations. To an extent, this corroborates Žižek’s analysis of public life 
and politics as based on the idea of ‘economy as ideology’, globally;70 one could add that the 
annex to this knowledge/power has become security as ideology. 
To this scholarship, we counterpoise and encourage for what Asef Bayat defined as 
a scholarship of silence.71 Through the hermeneutics of the passive, silent and revolutionary 
existences of ordinary people, of established and underground institutions, of cultural, 
economic as well as scientific, technological phenomena,72 today’s epistemic community 
can discern what cannot be taxominised in questionnaires, numerical schemata, statistical 
cases and elite interviews. As the practical boundaries of this essay did not allow a thorough 
exemplification of this kind of scholarship, our key objective has been to demonstrate, 
through both theoretical and observational instances, its validity. This scholarship reads the 
silences in the news, it attempts to identify and to interpret the disorderly monotony of the 
streets and of contentious existences in spite of the state and of Western misinterpretations 
of the rest of the world.73 Its undertaking is, alas!, piecemeal, but its potential endless. 
*** 
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